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The Changing Returns to Education: An
Analysis of the Returns to Education as they
Change from 2002 to 2012 in 5 Countries
Jonas Wightman
Abstract
Education is widely understood to impact
earnings, but the dynamics of this relationship –
specifically, the returns to education – are important
to consider in depth. Through a synthesis of human
capital theory and the Paradox of Progress, which
relates income ine-quality to educational attainment, I explore how the returns to education have
changed over time. I use 2002 and 2012 International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) income and education data to first determine the returns to education
within the United States, Germany, Poland, Slovenia,
and Sweden with OLS regressions and then to comparatively analyze how the measure changed from
one year to the next in each country. I find that there
is not a consistent pattern of change across the entire
panel of countries, which sug-gests that the Paradox
of Progress might not be universally pertinent.
I. Introduction
Education is widely understood to impact
earnings. But the dynamics of this relationship – specifically, the degree to which education leads to higher income later in life – are important to consider in
depth. An understanding of this phenomenon informs individuals’ decisions regarding the pursuit of
educational attainment; is one more year of schooling
worth the time it detracts from other pursuits – say,
entering the labor force? It is an important decision
and, while there are many other elements to consider
when making it, an understanding of the returns to
education can prove instrumental.
But these returns change over time; the relative value
of education today is not the same as it was ten years
ago. And so a measure of education’s contemporaneous impacts does not provide insight into how

the benefits of schooling change as time progresses.
This essay considers these dynamics by examining the
returns to education within a panel of countries at two
points in time – in 2002 and in 2012 – and comparing
them. Through this analysis, we can track changes in
the value of education over time and, by the nature of
this particular approach, across countries.
In Section II, I provide an overview of human capital theory and a commentary on the findings
of François Bourguignon, Francisco H. C. Ferreira,
and Nora Lustig (2005) as they pertain to the value
of education. I then consolidate the foundations and
conclusions of this theory and these findings to present the hypothesis that the value of education will rise
over time. Section III discusses the datasets with which
I assess the returns to education, the processes through
which I made these data effective, and the models I
use to determine the returns to education. Section IV
analyzes the results from the models provided in Section III and Section V speaks to their findings and the
impli-cations we can pull from them.
II. Theory & Literature
A. Human Capital Theory
While the concepts it seeks to address have
been present in economic schools of thought for quite
some time, human capital theory has only existed in the
capacity it does now for about three decades (Rosen,
2008). It is an outgrowth of capital theory, which seeks
to explain the allocation and both the short-term and
long-term effects that investment in resources yield
(Bliss, 2005). In human capital theory, this investment in re-sources takes shape through education and
training (Becker, 1964). The theory expresses that, over
their life cycle, individuals can develop their skills and
earning capacity. As such, it effectively explains how
self-investment can lead to higher levels of short-term
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earnings and long-term wealth.
Becker addresses on-the-job training and various other
methods of gaining knowledge, but most of the theory
– and this essay – focuses on education. In this context, human capital theory suggests positive returns to
education. This is not disputed. It is very widely accepted that increases to education lead to higher levels of
income , though there is some debate over the dynamics of this relationship. Signalling theory, for instance,
suggests that individuals do not obtain education to develop their human capital but rather to signal a variety
of desirable traits–discipline, drive, intelligence, and the
ability to learn, to name a few–to potential employers.
Both of these theories correlate higher levels
of education with higher levels of wealth, but human
capital theory presents education as the cause of this
positive correla-tion. This essay will explore the relationship that education has with income. By placing
this conversation within human capital theory, we can
discuss changes in the education-income correlation in
terms of returns to education.
B. Education & Income Inequality
François Bourguignon, Francisco H. C. Ferreira, and Nora Lustig (2005) edited a book titled The
Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dynamics
in East Asia and Latin America in which they attempt
to explore the changes in the distribution of income
during periods of economic development; their intention with this book is not to propose a universal theory
on income distribution or development but rather to
show that there is an incredible amount of diversity
in the developmental processes of different countries.
They approach this topic with a somewhat narrowed
lens, focusing on seven countries within East Asia and
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, and Taiwan.
The time periods in each of these countries that
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig examined were not
consistent in length–their analysis of Brazil included
data spanning a 20 year period while the Colombian
data ranges only 7 years–but all seven case studies cover periods ending in the mid to late 1990’s. The inconsistency in duration is obviously undesirable, but the
bulk of their analysis only considers the beginning and
end of the sampled period, which produces less inconsistency than if they considered shorter-term changes
within the countries with larger sample periods.
They use a generalized form of the Oaxaca32

Blinder decomposition method to consider more
intimately the causal effects of various changes
within these countries. Bourguignon, Ferreira,
and Lustig use the technique to explore income
inequality at a national scale; its implementation is
similar in nature to the labor-market applications
for which it was developed and initially used, but
repurposed for a macroeconomic analysis of overall income inequality and the effects of a slightly
broader variety of indicators – most importantly
for the purposes of this paper: education levels .
One of Bourguignon, Ferriera, and Lustig’s
primary focuses related to the levels of educational
attainment in these countries. Unsurprisingly, average levels of education rose in all seven countries;
but the dynamics of this change were unexpected.
One might think that developing countries, in particular, would experience larger rises in educational
attainment among the younger members of society
and thus a widening of the educational attainment
gap between younger working-age individuals and
older working-age individuals. This would reflect
the widely popularized developmental pattern presented by Simon Kuznets (Kuznets, 1955).
But, while I expect this pattern might still hold
in more undeveloped parts of the world, Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig did away with this
concept within their study by noting that:
“In actual fact, the distribution of schooling levels
in the population at working age became more
equal in all seven countries. The difference across
countries in the effect of more education on inequality must, therefore, lie in the mechanism of
transmission from education to household incomes, rather than the dynamics of the distribution
of years of schooling itself.”
(Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Lustig, 2005, p. 394)
And so we see that a country’s stage of development does not signal any particularly relevant details about the distribution of education within its
borders. Levels of educational attainment equalized
across the board.
In Subsection A of this section, we established that earnings were tightly tied to an individual’s education. Here, we see that educational levels
became more similar across the population. Ceteris
paribus, we would expect these two premises, in
conjunction, to reduce income inequality – indi-
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viduals across the country are obtaining more similar
levels education and thus should obtain more similar
levels of income. But this is not what we see.
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s analysis revealed that income inequality actually rose in
nearly all of the countries in question. They present
a concept they label ‘The Paradox of Progress’ to
discuss this. Generally, increases in educational attainment and decreases in inequality are both viewed
as signs of progress. But the Paradox of Progress
suggests that these do not go hand-in-hand; instead,
increases in educational attainment actually cause
higher levels of income inequality.
Their analysis identifies that the educationinequality relationship is rooted in how education
translates into earnings rather than how education
is distributed across the population. More than this,
they do not comment on the causes for the Paradox
of Progress. I suggest that the cause relates to the
returns to education.
Gasparini, Marchionni, and Escudero (2005)
conclude after a regression analysis of wage-education profiles in Argentina that, “[in] summary,
the changes in the returns to education appear to
have been mildly inequality reducing between 1986
and 1992 and strongly inequality increasing in the
next six years.” (p. 56) This is a simple, yet profound
finding: the returns to education impacted income
inequality to varying degrees at different points in
time.
The role of education actually changed
enough between these two periods to have a drastically different effect. And if the effect of education
on income inequality changes while the distribution
of schooling becomes more uniform, the value of
education must be changing. This takes Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s conclusions regarding the
relevance of the mechanisms of transmission from
education to earnings and suggests that the returns
to education might be a primary cause for the Paradox of Progress.
In this essay, I examine the impacts of education as they change over time. If these returns rise
consistently, it suggests that increasing returns to
education are a primary cause for the Paradox of
Progress. And so, I hypothesize that the returns to
education increase over time.
III. Empirical Model

To explore this relationship, I use data from
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a
program co-founded in 1984 through the collaborative efforts of various universities and research institutions to develop data that is internationally comparable and targeted at particular areas of focus. These
data are collected independently by various entities
associated with ISSP and compiled by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of
Cologne in collaboration with the Analisis Sociologicos, Economicos y Politicos in Spain. The questions
and topics are originally written in English and developed in a manner so as to be relevant in all countries
involved.
ISSP conducts a variety of surveys focused on
different topics; one of its more unique traits is the
fact that the same sorts of surveys are conducted periodically. The particular data I use here are from the
Family and Changing Gender Roles Surveys of 2002
and 2012. I focus on five countries: the United States,
Germany , Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. The surveys
in each of these countries gathered data on over 900
subjects.
The ISSP provides comprehensive survey data
– the topic-relevant survey ques-tions are generated
and translated collaboratively across the involved
countries, so this information is consistent and relatively straightforward. But much of the other relevant
data – particularly measures of income – are not
normalized across the different countries. This information is gathered in local currency units and is often
measured on varying scales; for instance, data collectors in the United States ask respondents for annual
income while those in European countries are usually
interested in monthly earnings. Further, while most
surveys ask for post-tax income, some are concerned
with respondent earnings prior to tax payments. This
is particularly problematic in Europe, where many
countries implement social-democratic welfare regimes.
I normalized these data into annual terms
and into 2010 USD using the Official Exchange Rate
and Consumer Price Index measures from The World
Bank’s World Development Indicators to convert local
currencies to USD and then to adjust for inflation. The
ISSP codebooks provided information on the various
questions asked in each country; I used these to identify those countries which gathered monthly data and
multiplied their earnings data by a factor of twelve
to convert them into annual measures. Sweden, in

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIV

33

Wightman
in each country, relative to the United States. This
does not provide much insight – certainly nothing
that we could not gather through other means – but
lays the groundwork for the second regression. The
coefficients in Model 2, on the other hand, allow us to
calculate the degree to which education impacts these
1.
LN_NORMINC = α + ß1 (GERMANY) + ß2 differences in income, relative to the United States.
(POLAND) + ß3 (SLOVENIA) + ß4 (SWEDEN)
With these we can compare the returns to education
in each of the five countries.
2.
LN_NORMINC = α + ß1 (GERMANY) + ß2
Further, running this regression in two years
(POLAND) + ß3 (SLOVENIA) + ß4 (SWEDEN) + ß5 expands the capacity of these models’ analytical
(EDUCATION) + ß6 (GE_EDU) + ß7 (PL_EDU) +
power. By comparing the results from both 2002 and
ß8 (SL_EDU) + ß9 (SW_EDU)
2012 side by side, we can view the relative changes in
education’s effects over time and derive the changes in
I created dummy variables for each of the five the returns to education in each of these countries. As
countries which allows us to select and isolate particu- per the conversation in Section II, I hypothesize that
lar countries relative to the United States in each of
these returns rise from 2002 to 2012.
the regression models. Model 2 introduces interaction
variables as well, to address the impacts of education IV. Results
on each of these countries individually. Table 1
A. Descriptive Statistics & Model 1 Regression Results
explains these variables.
As these data were conducted through surveys, not all individuals provided data for all fields. In
the case of this analysis, I excluded any education data
that did not fall in line with the continuous measure
I use here. I also excluded individuals that did not
provide income data. There were surveys in which the
highest option for reporting income read something
along the lines of ‘900,000 LCU and above.’ In these
cases, I recoded the values so that the lower bound
registered as the respondent’s income. After controlling for gaps in relevant data, the sample sizes for each
country fell. Table 2 shows the numbers of relevant
respondents in each country after adjusting for these
missing values.
Poland is the only country in which the
sample sizes fell by particularly large margins with
these controls, dropping by about 60% in both years.
As such, it is also the country with the smallest sample
pool. However, all of these countries still have enough
samples to be considered relevant for this analysis.
I use the natural logarithm of income rather
than the normalized measure of actual income as
the dependent variable here because income tends
to be non-linearly distributed. By taking the natural
logarithm, I effectively linearize the distribution of
income; this allows for a more accurate regression
analysis without having to implement a different type
of regression.
Model 1 expresses the average levels of income
2012, asked respondents for before-tax income; they
implement a flat tax at 56% across the population, so I
simply adjusted their normalized data accordingly.
With the income data consistent, I present two
regression models with which to interpret these data:
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Table 2 also shows average income and average
educational attainment in each of the five countries.
These measures can be calculated through the application of Model 1 and Model 2 (presented in Section
III), but Table 2’s data were collected through descriptive statistical methods. It is important to note here
that average education rose in each of these countries – considerably more so in Germany and Poland,
where average educational attainment rose by over
one year.
An application of Model 1 (see Table 3) yielded income measures that consistently scored within
$4 of those obtained through descriptive statistics. In
all but the two richest countries here, average income
rose from one period to the next. This reduction in
earnings within the United States and Sweden likely
relates to the changes in wage distribution resulting
from the financial crisis in the late 2000’s. There exists
evidence suggesting that income levels in the United
States have stagnated through the 21st century to
this point (Mischel & Davis, 2015) – for instance, the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis suggests that levels
of household income in 2012 are actually lower than
they were in 2002 (St. Louis Fed).

The most drastic change, however, was in
Poland where average income nearly doubled over the
course of the decade. During the global financial crisis, Poland experienced surprisingly negligible change
in unemployment – it actually fell slightly between
2007 and 2009. Further, its GDP expanded dramatically, growing by nearly 6% in the same period (Amable & Ken, 2011) This is partly because it adopted the
concept of the short-time work scheme from countries like Germany, Austria, and Japan, which effec-

tively limited the number of workers who were laid
off as a result of the economic recession.
But Poland’s economic policy as a whole
also differed from that of other OECD countries.
For example, unlike several other European states,
its currency was not tethered to the Euro. Countries
with strong currencies on the world market (IE: US
Dollars, Euros, etc.) and those countries who tied
their currencies to said strong currencies seemed
to experience much harsher recessionary effects.
Poland, in having complete control over its currency,
was able to respond more effectively to the recession
(Klein, 2012). This lack of tethering also allowed
Poland to keep its debt relatively low prior to and
throughout the financial crisis (Pleitgen, 2010).
Also important to note is that Poland, Slovenia, and East Germany were part of the Communist
bloc up until just before the 1990’s. The first several
years of economic transition from controlled systems to more laissez-faire economies saw dramatic
reductions in overall economic output throughout
the eastern bloc (European Commission, 2014); in
this period, things like union membership shifted
from being compulsory to being entirely optional
(Visser, 2006). Thus they experienced extreme
exchange rate volatility and large changes in CPI
(World Development Indicators). This instability
through much of the 1990’s justifies the relatively
low income levels in each of these countries (and the
surprisingly low average income measures within
Germany, since half of the economy was transitioning). Most of these countries recovered extremely
well through the later 1990’s to the onset of the global financial crisis (Carter, 2007). But the large-scale
changes occurring from the mid 1990’s through to
2012 are very likely reflected in these data – so, both
the low levels of income and the high degrees of
change from one period to the next can be accepted.
B. Model 2 Regression Results
The findings on which we must primarily focus, however, stem from Model 2’s results, presented
in Table 4. Here, the first four variables are applied in
the same way as in Model 1, the difference being that
they no longer provide a measure of average income.
Instead, α, GERMANY, POLAND, SLOVENIA, and
SWEDEN refer to only the non-educational components of respondents’ income.
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To examine the returns to education, we
must consider the final five variables presented.
Taken while all dummy and interaction variables
equal zero, EDUCATION provides us the returns to
education within the United States; by multiplying
ß6 by a given level of education – say, 12 years – and
adding that to the constant, we can calculate the expected earnings of an individual in the United States
with 12 years of education.

The same idea applies for the other countries
when their respective dummy variables and interaction terms are triggered. In this case, rather than
simply combining α and ß6, we must – say, for the
case of Germany – include α, ß1, ß6, and ß7. Examining ß7 on its own tells us how Germany’s returns
to education compare to those of the United States;
ß6 and ß7 taken in tandem reflect the returns to
education in Germany in an abso-lute sense.
But we are not concerned with the full power
of this model. Instead of focusing on the actual
earnings individuals are expected to obtain, we will
examine the changes in the returns to education – as
measured by the coefficients attached to EDUCATION, GE_EDU, PL_EDU, SL_EDU, and SW_EDU.
Table 4 presents these returns as they fall relative to
the United States’ returns to education.
36

Table 5 presents each country’s returns to education
in an absolute sense.

It is important to note that, in Table 5, the
interaction variables for GE_EDU and PL_EDU
were insignificant in 2002. The country dummy
variable for both GERMANY in 2002 and SLOVENIA in 2012 were also insignificant. But none of
this affects the ap-plicability of the model. Since we
are only focused on the returns to education, we are
not interested in calculating expected income; thus
the insignificance of GERMANY and SLOVENIA is
irrelevant. More importantly, the insignificance of
GE_EDU and PL_EDU does not render our model
useless for these two countries either. The irrelevance of these interaction terms merely means that
the returns to education in Germany and Poland
were not significantly different from those in the
United States. And so, in calculating the values presented in Table 5, we simply replace the coefficient
values in for GE_EDU and PL_EDU with zero, effectively setting them equal to the returns in the United
States.
Table 5 shows us that the returns to education rose in the United States, Slovenia, and Sweden
and that these returns fell in both Germany and Poland. The growth in returns was largest in the United
States, increasing by 4.5%. They grew by only half
as much in Slovenia, rising 2.3% over the decade in
question, and less than a third as much in Sweden.
But more interesting is the fall in returns within
Germany and Poland. The reduction in
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returns in Poland is small enough to be considered
negligible, registering at 0.2%, but Germany’s change
was only about 10% less than the United States – just
in the opposite direction.
V. Findings & Implications
The results of my model do not support my
hypothesis. They suggest that the re-turns to education rose in three countries, but fell in both Germany and Poland. This is unexpected, considering I
hypothesized that returns would rise in all countries,
but some of this may be explainable if we consider
the particular circumstances in each of these countries. Subsection A of this section explores three
potential explanations for these unexpected results.
A. Possible Explanations for Unexpected Findings
The first is that I may have been wrong to
consider Poland’s data representative. Subsection A
of Section IV noted that the sample size in Poland
was relatively miniscule and that data from over
60% of respondents were excluded in this analysis.
Further, the measures of average income in Poland
were surprisingly different from one period to the
next. All of this might signal that these data were not
as reliable as I took them to be when conducting my
analysis. Similar explanations could be extended to
Germany in that the ISSP data provided information on East and West Germany individually; in my
analysis I combined these two measures, which may
have affected the sanctity of the data. Additionally,
both coefficients attached to Germany in 2002 were
insignificant. This might also suggest flaws in those
data.
A second consideration is the handling of the
global financial crisis. We dis-cussed in Section IV
how Poland responded to economic depression. Poland’s short-term work schemes were based largely
off of those implemented in Germany – a country
that also fared well throughout the crisis. As mentioned earlier, these short-term work schemes effectively limit the number of employees an employer
can fire, instead causing employers to cut employee
work hours or salaries. This (1) would have a notably different effect on income inequality than would
individuals losing their jobs altogether and (2) could
directly affect the returns to education.

In the first case, inequality would increase
as unemployment rises – when some individuals
lose their jobs – or as individuals exit the labor force
entirely. But these short-term work schemes limit
the growth in unemployment and thus decrease the
ac-companying growth in income inequality. It is
likely that average income would suffer from these
actions, but inequality would not fall. And since our
hypothesis is based on the assumption – presented
through the Paradox of Progress – that inequality is
increasing as educational attainment increases, the
falling returns to education might not be counter to
the concepts upon which I constructed my hypothesis; instead, my assump-tions may have simply been
incorrect. With regards to the second possibility,
that these short-term work schemes might directly
affect the returns to education, returns might fall, in
part, because employers could not fire employees. To
maintain all of their workers, employers would be
forced to reduce employees’ salaries. In this case, the
reduction in incomes would cause the dollar-value
of education to fall. The effects of laying workers off
would likely serve to increase the returns to education, because employers might be more inclined to
retain more-educated employees; so, by reducing the
growth in unem-ployment, Germany and Poland
might have induced a reduction in the returns to
education.
A final possible explanation for these unpredicted changes relates to the increases in average
education. Over this ten year period, individuals obtained, on average, 1.04 and 1.70 years more
education in Germany and Poland, respectively.
Slovenia – the country with the next-highest degree
of change – saw an increase in average schooling of
only 0.66. Such a large rise in education in this time
period might cause employers to value education
less, since it would be so much more commonplace.
While each of these three potential explanations
holds some weight, none of them is strong enough to
discred-it my analysis.
B. Additional Findings
Also interesting is that there was no consistent pattern relating a country’s level of development
to changes in the returns to education within it. The
United States, Sweden and Germany experienced
radically different changes. The US’s returns grew by
the largest margins while Germany’s fell by a similar
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degree. While Sweden’s returns to education rose
like the United States’, it did so at less than a sixth the
magnitude. Slovenia’s and Poland’s changes were also
not particularly comparable, as Slovenia’s returns
grew notably while Poland’s fell minimally. This
supports Bourgignon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s (2005)
dismissal of economic development as a signal of
educational relevance – first discussed in Subsection
A of Section II.
C. Recommendations
These findings suggest that education is most
valuable in the United States. But it would be hasty
to recommend that other countries tailor their educational systems to more closely resemble the United
States’, as these findings do not shed light into why
the returns to education change. Just as they might
suggest that a United States education is more valuable than a German education, these results might
simply reflect that education is considered more
valuable within the US labor market than in Germany’s. This is a primary avenue for further research:
what are the causes for changes in the returns to
ed-ucation? Exploration of both (1) the value placed
on education in different labor markets and (2) the
degree to which different educational systems actually improve human capital would shed light into
this question.
Further, these results suggest that levels of
development do not impact the returns to education.
But, these countries are all fairly developed. Consideration of a broader range of countries would help
our understanding of how education is valued in
different types of labor markets. Specifically, greater
focus on the returns to education within the lesserdeveloped world could show whether these returns
are significantly different when larger differences in
development are present.
But my largest recommendation for future
research is that the Paradox of Progress not be assumed to be true. Subsection A of this section presented the possibility that income inequality actually
fell within Germany and Poland, which would suggest that the results of Model 2 actually comply with
the theory and findings expressed in Section II and
that the assumptions on which my hypothesis were
based – rather than my explanations for changes in
the returns to education – were flawed.

38

My findings alone do not yield policy recommendations, but the research I suggest might.
With an understanding of which education systems
are most effective at developing human capital, we
could suggest that certain systems be adopted while
others be abandoned. With a better understanding
of how different labor markets value education, we
could recommend particular levels of education for
individuals looking to join the labor force in certain
markets. And with an understanding of education’s
relationship to income inequality, we might better
understand the ways in which education increases
or decreases inequality or the means through which
inequality affects the valuation of education in particular markets.
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